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FAMILY ARBITRATION: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
SHELLEY MCGILL*
RgsuMi
La r~glementation introduite rcemment en Ontario en mati~re d'arbitrage familial
repr~sente une rupture importante avec la politique existante sur l'arbitrage. Le nou-
veau cadre comporte un m&anisme compliqu6 de freins et de contrepoids visant A
pr~munir les parties vuln~rables contre des accords pouvant intervenir avant rarbi-
trage. Il remet en question les principes bien 6tablis en mati~re d'arbitrage que sont
'autonomie des parties, la finalit6, et la confidentialit& Cet article passe en revue les
nouvelles exigences en mati~re d'arbitrage familial en vertu de la Loi de 2006 modi-
fiant des lois en ce qui concerne des questions familiales et 6tablit une comparaison
avec les recommandations de Marion Boyd, ex-procureure g~n~rale de l'Ontario,
contenues dans son rapport intitul6 Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting
Choice, Promoting Inclusion (,, Risolution de conflits dans le droit familial : prottger
le choix, promouvoir l'inclusion ,,). Les forces et les faiblesses du nouveau cadre d'ar-
bitrage familial sont discut~es, ainsi que les implications pour les politiques, et la
pratique, de l'arbitrage.
INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 20061 introduces a new
specialized category of arbitration to the ever-expanding arbitration field that al-
ready includes domestic arbitration, commercial arbitration, consumer arbitration,
and international commercial arbitration. Family arbitration 2 is being regulated in
* Assistant Professor, School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University
1. Bill 27, An Act to amend the Arbitration Act, 1991, the Child and Family Services Act, and the Family
Law Act in connection with family arbitration and related matters, and to amend the Children's Law
Reform Act in connection with the matters to be considered by the court in dealing with applications
for custody and access, 2nd Sess., 38th Leg., Ontario, 2005 (1st reading 15 November 2005, 2nd reading
23 and 28 November 2005, 3rd reading 14 February 2006). Committee hearings were held 16, 17, and
18 January 2006. The Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Bill 27, 2005), (FSLAA)
received royal assent on 23 February 2006. The arbitrations provisions contained in ss. 1, 4, and 5 were
not proclaimed in force. The Attorney General advises that this will not be done until the regulations
are ready. Attorney General, News Release, "Ontario Passes Family Statute Law Amendment Act" (15
February 2006), online: AG <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/news/2006/20060215-
famend.asp>.
2. Family arbitration is a new defined term under s. 1 (1) FSLAA. It includes arbitration of matters that
could be covered in a domestic contract and are resolved using Ontario or Canadian law. No other
criteria will qualify as family arbitration.
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response to concerns over the use of faith-based tribunals for family dispute resolu-
tion. The major concerns were that religious principles could be inconsistent with
Canadian principles of equality, the religious tribunal process may lack transparency,
and the lack of free and informed consent to the choice of a faith-based tribunal
could result in domination over vulnerable parties. The new Act represents a well-
intentioned legislative attempt to protect the vulnerable, but severely erodes existing
arbitration policy that prioritizes a party's right to select the process, the expert, and
the applicable law.
Family arbitration will be a separate process regulated by both the Ontario Arbitration
Act, 19913 and the Family Law Act.4 The new process outlined in the Family Statute
Law Amendment Act, 2006 departs from arbitration policy5 and undermines the
traditional advantages associated with the choice of arbitration. The result will be
a reduction in the number of family disputes resolved this way. Historically, disput-
ants chose arbitration because of the speed with which it can be completed using
a process and an expert of their choice. The resulting award is private and final.
Family arbitration represents a second recent departure from a longstanding Ontario
policy in favour of arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements. The
break with policy is even more severe than the recommended changes proposed by
Marion Boyd's report on faith-based arbitration. 6 This paper will review the new
requirements for family arbitration and assess the impact of the changes on arbitra-
tion advantages and policy.
THE BOYD RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FAMILY STATUTE LAW
AMENDMENT AcT, 2006
In December 2004, after months of studying the use of private arbitration to resolve
family and inheritance disputes and the impact of religious tribunals on the vulner-
able, Marion Boyd, former Attorney General of Ontario, released a report entitled
Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion, contain-
ing forty-six recommendations. The Boyd recommendations proposed many of the
requirements that now appear in the new legislation, including independent legal
advice, regulation of family arbitrators, and adoption of domestic contract status
and protections for family arbitration agreements. 7 However, the new Family Law
Statue Amendment Act, 2005 (FSLAA) rejects the most fundamental and underlying
3. Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, c. 17.
4. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E 3.
5. Ontario adopted a new arbitration policy with the introduction of the Arbitration Act, 1991. This pol-
icy is outlined later in this paper. See notes 25 and 28.
6. Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion [Boyd report]
(Toronto: A.G., 2004), online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd>.
7. S. McGill, "Religious Tribunals and the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991: The Catalyst for Change" (2005)
20 J.L. & Social Pol'y 53.
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premise of all the Boyd recommendations: retention of the right to choose religious
principles as a choice of law.
The Boyd scheme respected party autonomy and retained a party's right to choose
any law for use in family arbitration, including faith-based principles. In an effort
to retain this fundamental advantage of arbitration, the report recommended an
elaborate scheme aimed at creating informed consent to faith-based choices through
the use of a statement of faith-based principles and independent legal advice.8 It rec-
ommended expanded government and court oversight of faith-based outcomes to
ensure compatibility with fundamental Canadian principles.9
The concerns expressed by critics of faith-based tribunals were that some religious
principles may discriminate against women, may not respect the principle of the best
interests of the children, may not respect equality principles, and may not be compat-
ible with Ontario family law.10 There was also fear that vulnerable parties may feel
compelled by their religious community to choose a religious tribunal, despite the
fact that it was not in their best interests. In this circumstance, the party could not
make a free and informed choice. Despite the fact that Boyd found no evidence of
systemic discrimination against women involved in family arbitration, opposition
to the use of religious principles in family arbitration remained high, even after the
release of the Boyd report.11 It was suspected that abuses may not come to light in the
private forum of arbitration. Boyd's elaborate process designed to provide free and
informed consent would ensure that unfair results would be binding on women. The
FSLAA responds to these concerns by eliminating religious principles as an available
choice of law in family arbitration.
The FSLAA did not take the most drastic position possible: a complete ban on family
arbitration, as has been done in Quebec. 12 Instead, it amends the Family Law Act and
the Arbitration Act, 1991 to specifically create a new category of arbitration: family
arbitration. This new category is allowed only a very narrow choice of law. Family
arbitration is defined as an arbitration that deals with any matter that could be coy-
8. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendations 2, 16, 17, 22, 24, & 46.
9. Ibid., Recommendation 34, 40, 41, & 46. For a more complete discussion of the Boyd recommenda-
tions, see McGill, supra note 7.
10. McGill, supra note 7 at 54. See Alia Hogben, "The laws of the land must protect all of us, irrespective
of gender or religion" Editorial, Toronto Star (1 June 2004); Natasha Bakht, "Family Arbitration Using
Sharia Law: Examining Ontario's Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women" National Association of
Women and the Law, online: <http://www.nawl.ca/brief-sharia.html>.
11. Boyd, supra note 6 at 133; Pamela Cross, "An Analysis of Marion Boyd's Review 'Dispute Resolution
in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion" online: Ontario Women's Justice Network
<http://www.owjn.org/issues/mediatio/boyd.htm>.
12. Article 2639, Civil Code of Quebec, S.O. 1991, c. 64; Quebec has also passed a resolution opposing the
establishment of Islamic tribunals. This opposition is not restricted to family dispute resolution. Que-
bec National Assembly, 37th Legislature, Session 1, Motion 26 May 2005, online: National Assembly
<http://www.assnat.qc.ca/eng/37legislaturel/Pv/PA20050526.pdf>.
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ered in a domestic contract and that is conducted using law from only Canadian
jurisdictions. 13 This definition excludes much more than just religious principles as
potential choices of law. Legal principles from any other jurisdiction are excluded,
for example, from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia. The use of
the word "exclusively" restricts the application of any other consideration in even a
minor way. Comparisons with American or English jurisprudence would be blocked.
Any arbitration of family matters that is not determined using Canadian law is not
considered a family arbitration; the award has no legal affect; and it cannot be en-
forced through the courts. It is considered advice only.
It would have been possible for the amendments to stop at this point, having elimin-
ated the risks associated with the choice of religious principles. However, the legisla-
tion goes on to incorporate many of the protections recommended by Boyd now
being applied to protect the vulnerable for a more general purpose. The result is a
far more controlled process for family arbitrations than any other type of arbitration.
The protections have a slightly narrower application than Boyd recommended. The
new legislation makes no mention of inheritance disputes, as Boyd did. Only those
limited spousal election areas that could be dealt with in domestic contracts will be
covered by the new protections. In addition, many of the Boyd recommendations
covered both mediation and arbitration. The FSLAA makes no reference to media-
tion or mediation agreements except to amend the Child and Family Services Act to
include arbitrators and mediators as professionals required to report a child in need
of protection. 14
An agreement that calls for family arbitration is now a domestic contract governed by
the Family Law Act.15 It may be set aside for the same reasons as any other domestic
contract, as well as for failure to comply with the Arbitration Act, 1991, or its regula-
tions. The rules relating to the form of the agreement and the process for entering
into the agreement are split between the two acts. The Arbitration Act, 1991 is given
the power to regulate the form of family arbitration agreements including standard
clauses and awards. Boyd's recommendation number 12 included detailed sugges-
tions about the contents of an arbitration agreement, including explicit statements
outlining available remedies under all legislation. The FSLAA regulations are not yet
in place. The Family Law Act requires writing, signatures, witnessing, and complete
financial disclosure. This disclosure will be necessary even though the dispute may
involve only custody and access. It is required for the validity and enforceability of
the agreement; it is not tied to the substantive issue in dispute.
13. Sections 1 and 2.2 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, S.0. 1992, c. 17 as am. by ss. 1 (1) & (2) FSLAA; Section
51 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E 3, as am. by s. 5 (7) FSLAA; Section 32 of the Arbitration
Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, c. 17, allows parties involved in other domestic arbitration to designate any rule
of law to be applied by the arbitrator. This section no longer applies to family arbitration.
14. Section 72 (5) sub. para (b.2), Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 11, as am. by s. 2 FS-
LAA.
15. Section 51, Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E 3, as am. by s. 5(6) FSLAA, supra note 1.
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Unlike other domestic contracts, a family arbitration agreement must be entered into
after the original dispute arises and with independent legal advice. Boyd did not ban
pre-dispute agreements, but called for a reconfirmation of the choice of arbitration
after the dispute arose. 16 The result would have been a less extreme departure from
the traditional advantages of arbitration. Critics argued that this trapped the vulner-
able party once the pre-agreement steps were complied with.1 7
The independent legal advice requirements contained in the FSLAA go further than
the Boyd recommendations. There is no opportunity to waive the requirement of
obtaining independent legal advice prior to entering into the agreement, as the Boyd
report allowed.' 8 An award arising from an agreement entered into without in-
dependent legal advice is automatically unenforceable without the application of the
principles of undue influence or unconscionability. Interestingly, this is not the case
for other domestic contracts. There is an exception made for secondary arbitrations;
these are continuing disputes leading to multiple arbitrations where a separation
agreement contains the original arbitration agreement. Any subsequent arbitration is
considered as arising from a post-dispute agreement and is exempt from any further
independent legal advice requirement.
Boyd placed additional responsibilities on mediators and arbitrators to assess free
and informed consent with specific consideration for domestic violence and power
imbalances. The Arbitration Act, 1991 is amended by the FSLAA to give the power to
regulate arbitrators on this issue and to prescribe mandatory training in this type of
screening. 19 As previously stated, compliance with the regulations is necessary before
enforcement under the Family Law Act can take place. It is hard to assess the impact
of yet unwritten regulations, but there is a concern arising from the enforcement pro-
hibition for non-compliance with the regulations. Many of the regulatory topics deal
with arbitrator qualifications and administrative record-keeping. These regulations
may result in an innocent party being unable to enforce an otherwise acceptable
award as a result of an unknown administrative breach by the arbitrator.
The yet unknown qualifications required of a family arbitrator may be the subject
of regulations under the Arbitration Act, 1991. The regulatory power is permissive
and not mandatory. Boyd recommended mandatory membership in an approved
16. Article 2639, Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q, 1991, c. 64.
17. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Official Re-
port of Debates (Hansard), No. G011 (16 January 2006), online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/
web/committee-proceedings/committee-transcriptsdetails.do?locale=en&Date=2006-
01-16&ParlCommlD=7422&BillID=297&Business=Bill+27%2C+Family+Statute+-
Law+Amendment+Act%2C+200>; (16 January 2006), online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/
committee-proceedings/committee transcripts-details.do?locale=en&Date=2006-01-17&ParlComm
ID=7422&BiIIID=297&Business=Bill+27%2C+Family+Statute+Law+Amendment+Act%2C+2006>.
18. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendations 13, 21, 22, 23, & 24; s. 59.6 (1) & (2) Family Law Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F. 3, as am. by s. 5 (10) FSLAA, supra note 1.
19. Section 58, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, c. 17, as am. bys. 1 (11) FSLAA, supra note 1.
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professional organization and speculated that a self-regulating profession should be
the goal. This objective hardly seems necessary any longer. If the only choice of law
is the law of a Canadian jurisdiction, it seems that the various law societies are the
only organizations in a position to determine who has the requisite expertise to apply
the respective legal principles. It is possible that other organizations such as the ADR
Institute of Ontario will be marginalized. An arbitrator's need for training in screen-
ing for domestic violence and power imbalances may also be the subject of future
regulation. Concern has been raised about imposing the responsibility for screening
on the arbitrator.20 This will require an arbitrator to meet separately with each party
and consider information that is not supplied to the other party. This is a concern for
fair and equal process. Presently, we do not know who will be considered qualified
to arbitrate family disputes or what screening tasks they will be required to complete.
The missing regulations are a key element in arbitrator qualification.
Family arbitration is now more controlled than other domestic arbitration. The
legislation made no attempt to define the existing requirement of a "fair and equal
process" as was suggested by the Boyd report. 21 However, the FSLAA does adopt
the screening obligations associated with power and violence. If this becomes the
responsibility of the arbitrator, valuable neutrality and impartiality will be lost. The
process is also changed by enshrining the right to appeal an award to the Family
Court or the Superior Court of Justice and dispensing with the deemed waiver
of defects that arises from participation in any other domestic arbitration. The
existing waivable appeal right applies only to matters of law unless the agreement
allows appeals on fact. The new unwaivable appeal right will lengthen the process.
The FSLAA amends the Children's Law Reform Act to clearly articulate the "best
interests of the child" as the standard to be applied in determining custody and
access issues. Section 24 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors and a limitation
on the use of past conduct. Violence against members of the family or household is
now a mandatory consideration.
A family arbitration award may be enforced under the Family Law Act only after
compliance with all of the legislative and regulatory requirements of the Arbitration
Act, 1991.22 This means the existing arbitration requirement that awards be written,
reasons be given, and copies be provided to the parties has new teeth, since non-
compliance will prevent enforcement. 23 The permissive regulatory powers of the
Arbitration Act, 1991 hint that the Boyd recommendations relating to government
20. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, "Submissions of Ontario
Bar Association" in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. G011 (16 January 2006), online: <http://
www.ontla.on.ca/hansard/committeedebates/38-parl/session2/GenGov/GO 11 .htm#P544_16347>.
21. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendation 15.
22. Section 59 (6), Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 3 as am. by FSLAA.
23. Section 38, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, c. 17.
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oversight, reporting, and arbitrator record-keeping will be adopted.24 Again, admin-
istrative record-keeping errors will block enforcement of an otherwise acceptable
arbitration award. Boyd recommended that this type of infraction be grounds for
removal from the professional association. In addition to being subject to an unwaiv-
able right to appeal, an award may be set aside for all of the same reasons as a domes-
tic contract. No mention is made of interlocutory or interim awards. Currently, these
are enforced through s. 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991. Moving enforcement entirely
to the Family Law Act makes the Arbitration Act, 1991 process unavailable for this
purpose. The FSLAA makes no specific mention of interim awards but adopts s. 50
language for enforcement under the Family Law Act.
The enforcement mechanism set out in s. 59.8 of the Family Law Act allows for
swift access to the courts upon the filing of a copy of the award, the agreement, and
the certificate of independent legal advice. The court is obligated to enforce the
award along the same lines as set out in s. 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, provided
the appeal period has passed. One phrase borrowed from s. 50 could lead to com-
plications in enforcement. A court may replace the remedy granted in an award
with one of its own choosing if the court finds that the remedy in the award is one
that the court "would not grant in a proceeding based on similar circumstances.
It is possible that this entitles the court to conduct a review on the merits prior to
enforcement. Traditional forms of enforcement are still available through s. 59.6
of the Family Law Act, which allows a family arbitration award to be enforced in
the same way as a domestic contract. Presumably, this means through a breach of
contract action.
Generally, the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 presents a tightly controlled
process. The responsibilities and requirements are inefficiently split between the
Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act, 1991, and parties will have to consult both
pieces of legislation to ensure that the resulting award is enforceable. Many of the
most important details, particularly of interest to the arbitration profession, have
been left to the regulations and are still unknown.
EFFECTS ON TRADITIONAL ADVANTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH ARBITRATION
Traditional advantages of the choice of arbitration as a dispute-resolution mechan-
ism include party autonomy, process design, choice of adjudicator, privacy, finality,
speed, and low cost. The volume delays in the public system are eased when more
disputes are resolved privately. There is a cost saving to the public, and research indi-
cates that parties have increased satisfaction and higher compliance rates when they
24. Boyd, supra note 6, Recommendations 38-41; Section 58, Arbitration Act, 1991, supra note 3.
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have more control over the process. 25 The new rules for family arbitration diminish
the value of each of these advantages.
Party autonomy is usually identified with the parties' ability to design a process that
meets their specific needs and preferences. Parties electing family arbitration will
now have significantly less opportunity to modify the process than was previously
available to them under the Arbitration Act, 1991. The most fundament change will
be the inability to choose any law other than the law of a Canadian jurisdiction. This
eliminates much more than just faith-based principles and ensures that the outcome
will mirror a court result. All custody issues must be decided using the best interests
of the child as a standard, and the legislation includes a list of factors. If the parties
want to use any other substantive criteria for determining their dispute, the arbitra-
tion will not meet the new definition of a family arbitration.26 Any resulting award
will be unenforceable. 27 There is an expanded list of process requirements that par-
ties may not contract out of, including the right to an appeal, the obligation to obtain
independent legal advice, and mandatory contents of a family arbitration agreement.
In short, family arbitration is now tightly controlled, with limited opportunity for
parties to fit the process to their needs and less likelihood that the result will be
anything other than what a court would do.
The use of an adjudicator who has particular expertise, experience, or sensitivity
to the parties needs has been one of the most valued advantages of arbitration. The
selection of a family arbitrator will now be limited to adjudicators who meet the yet
unknown regulatory requirements. So far, the requirements may include member-
ship in an approved professional organization and mandatory training in screening
for domestic violence and power imbalance. Parties will be restricted to those adjudi-
cators who have expertise in Ontario law or another Canadian legal jurisdiction. The
parties may still seek advice from other experts, but their opinions will be of no legal
effect. One has to assume that this will significantly limit the pool of family arbitra-
tion professionals to lawyers and retired judges.
25. Party satisfaction and compliance studies: J. Pearson, "An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adju-
dication' (1982) The Justice System J. 7, at 420-25; R. Wissler, "Mediation and Adjudication in Small
Claims Court" (1995) 29 L. & Soc'y Rev. 323. For a more complete discussion of the traditional advan-
tages of arbitration, see
J.G. Castel, "International Commercial Arbitration" in D. Paul Emond, ed., Commercial Dispute Reso-
lution (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1989) 121; WH. Hulburt, "New Legislation for Domestic Arbitra-
tions" (1992) 21 Can. Bus. L.J. 1; Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Arbitration
(Vancouver: The Commission, 1982); Randy A. Pepper, "Why arbitrate? Ontario's recent experience
with Commercial Arbitration" (1998) 4 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807; Claude R. Thomson & Annie M.K. Finn,
"International Commercial Arbitration: A Canadian Perspective" in International Commercial Arbitra-
tion in the New Millennium (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 2001) online: <http://www.fasken.
com/web/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/00B70F5AFC39ADD7872569B4005EEB9B?OpenDocument>.
26. Section 1 (1), FSLAA, supra note 1.
27. Ibid. s. 1 (2).
Family Arbitration: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 57
Parties can no longer ensure that an arbitration award is final. An unwaivable right
of appeal to either the Family Court or Superior Court applies to all family arbitra-
tion awards. Participation in the process will not be considered a waiver of any prior
defect or non-compliance with either act. The opportunities to set aside or enforce a
family arbitration award are altered to mirror a party's right to set aside or enforce a
domestic contract. This will include imperfect financial disclosure. There is no doubt
that the advantage of finality is lost.
If the regulatory power under the Arbitration Act, 1991 is exercised, the ability to
keep a family arbitration award private and confidential will be reduced. Arbitrators
may be required to submit a copy of every award to a designated government of-
ficial. This copy is to have names and other identifying information removed, but
high-profile parties may still be identifiable even after these precautions are taken.
Family arbitrators will be required to keep a record of each arbitration for a pre-
scribed period of time. The existence of an unwaivable appeal right will mean any
party can move the process to the public court system. It is likely that the advantage
of privacy is lost.
All of the new requirements will have an impact on the cost of arbitration and the
time it will take to complete. The regulation of family arbitration professionals will
come at a cost. A reduced pool of arbitrators, licensing, insurance requirements,
membership, training, and record-keeping will all affect the bottom line. The parties
will bear an additional cost for independent legal advice and power screening. Since
the agreement must be entered into after the dispute arises, it is less likely that enter-
ing into a family arbitration agreement will be quick and easy. The many new oppor-
tunities to attack the agreement and set aside or appeal the award will undoubtedly
slow the process and increase the costs.
As a result of all of the foregoing, family arbitration under the new regime bares
little resemblance to the arbitration available to family disputants prior to the Family
Statute Law Amendment Act, 2005. It does not offer any of the traditional advantages
associated with arbitration. In its new form, family arbitration is hardly an alternative
to the court process at all, when lawyers and retired judges apply Ontario law to come
to a result that may be appealed to an Ontario Court on a question of law.
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A RETREAT FROM THE POLICY IN FAVOUR OF ARBITRATION
When Ontario enacted the Arbitration Act, 1991, it proclaimed a new policy in fa-
vour of arbitration, party autonomy, and enforcement of arbitration agreements. The
fundamental principles behind this legislation are:
1. Parties who enter into valid arbitration agreements should be held to those agreements
(strict enforcement of arbitration agreements).
2. Parties should have broad freedom to design the arbitral process as they see fit (party
autonomy).
3. The process should be fair to both parties (fair process).
4. Arbitration awards should be readily enforceable, subject to only limited review for a spe-
cific list of fatal flaws of form or procedure (no appeal on the merits).28
Parties were given the right to design their own process and to limit the right of
appeal. It expanded the right to choose the substantive criteria for determination
of a dispute and it allowed parties to enforce an award through the courts. The
court's power to set aside an agreement or an award was restricted. A court's power
to intervene was allowed only for the purposes of assisting the arbitration, ensuring
adherence to the arbitration agreement, preventing unfair or unequal treatment of
parties, and enforcing the awards. A stay of a court action was mandatory when a
valid arbitration agreement existed.29
Courts embraced the new policy and routinely stayed court actions in favour of the
arbitration process. 30 The Arbitration Act, 1991 was interpreted as encouraging par-
ties to choose arbitration as a method to resolve disputes; enforcing arbitration over
court processes when parties selected arbitration; and encouraging parties to stay
with arbitration once commenced. 31
Arbitration agreements were interpreted broadly to cover as many disputes as could
reasonably be contemplated, and when more than one interpretation was possible,
the interpretation that favoured arbitration was taken.32
28. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Eighteenth
Session (3-21 June 1985), C. Gaz. Part 1, Vol. 120, No. 40, 1986 Suppl.; introduction of the Arbitration
Act, 1991 in the Ontario Legislature, by then Attorney General Howard Hampton, echoed these funda-
mental principles. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) (27 March 1991)
at 1350 (H. Hampton), online: <http://hansardindex.ontla.on.ca/hansardeissue/35-1/1007.htm>.
29. Section 7, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1992, c. 17, supra note 3.
30. Ontario Hydro v. Denison Mines Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 2948 (CanLII), Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Can-
ada, [1992] O.J. No. 2382 (CanLIl); Buck Bros. Ltd. v. Frontenac Builders, [1994] O.J. No. 37 (CanLIl);
Onex Corp. v. Ball Corp., [1994] 12 B.L.R. (2nd) 151; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Lovat Tunnel
Equipment Inc. (1999) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Ont. C.A.); Diamond & Diamond v. Srebrolow, [2003] O.J.
No. 4004 (CanLII); Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. [2002] O.J. No. 665 (Ont. S. C.) (CanLII).
31. Ontario Hydro v. Denison Mines Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 2948 (CanLII) at para. 6.
32. Diamond & Diamond v. Srebrolow, [2003] O.J. No. 5929 aff'd. [2003] O.J. No. 4004 (Ont. C.A.) (Can-
LII).
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When arbitration policy clashed with other legislative agendas, the policy in favour
of arbitration prevailed. A recent example of the application of this priority came
in the Ontario Superior Court decision of Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc.33 Arbitration
policy conflicted with consumer protection and class actions policies when a man-
datory arbitration clause was inserted in a standard form consumer contract. The
court upheld the clause and stayed the uncertified class action citing the primacy of
arbitration policy over class action policy.
In the summer of 2005, the Ontario government made its first departure from arbi-
tration policy in the area of consumer arbitration and the recognition of arbitration
agreements. The Consumer Protection Act, 2002,34 which was proclaimed in force on
31 July 2005, creates a distinction between pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration
agreements for consumer disputes. Pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements are
no longer enforceable. This was done in reaction to Kanitz. Post-dispute arbitration
agreements remain regulated by the Arbitration Act, 1991, in the same way as other
domestic arbitrations.
The regulation of family arbitration as a separate category marks Ontario's second
and most drastic departure from existing arbitration policy. The FSLAA moves pre-
agreement requirements, form, avoidance, and enforcement of family arbitration
agreements and awards to the Family Law Act. It makes family law principles para-
mount over arbitration principles if there is conflict between the two. It adopts the
pre-dispute and post-dispute distinction that was created in the Consumer Protection
Act, 2002 and renders pre-dispute agreements and resulting awards unenforceable.
This amounts to a retroactive change for parties who have already entered into
marriage contracts electing arbitration as the method to resolve disputes. A new
post-dispute agreement will need to be made. The new enforcement regime also has
retroactive impact for those arbitrations that have already been completed but the
resulting awards have not been enforced through the courts. The FSLAA does not ex-
pressly state retroactive application but the result is to render previously unenforced
awards no longer enforceable. 35
The effect of the new hybrid family arbitration process is a departure from all four
founding principles: parties have greater opportunity to avoid family arbitration
agreements once made; parties have less opportunity to design their own process;
33. [2002] O.J. No. 665 (Ont. S.C.) (CanLII) [Kanitz]; S. McGill, "Consumer Arbitration: Levelling the
Playing Field" (paper presented at the Academy of Legal Studies in Business Conference, San Fran-
cisco, August 2005) [unpublished].
34. Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O., c. 30, Sch. A [CPA].
35. The general presumption against retroactivity is applied to substantive not procedural legislation. Un-
less enforcement has been commenced prior to the proclamation of the FSLAA, the procedural steps
necessary for enforcement will block prior non-compliant awards from access to the new enforcement
regime. Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I. 11; Temelini v. Wright, (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 609 (ON C.A.);
Angus v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 256 at 262.
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the process may lack fairness and equality if the arbitrator neutrality is compromised
by screening requirements; and there are expanded opportunities for court review or
appeal and reduced opportunity for enforcement.
Each legislative exception to the fundamental principles behind arbitration erodes
the general policy in favour of arbitration. Two such departures in a six-month per-
iod appears to be a shift in legislative policy away from encouraging parties to choose
arbitration as a method to resolve disputes or holding them to it once the choice is
made.
REDEEMING FEATURES OF THE NEW FAMILY ARBITRATION SCHEME
The new family arbitration process is not a complete repudiation of arbitration.
In Ontario, unlike Quebec, family disputants may still choose arbitration. Quebec
removed arbitration entirely from family law disputes and will also ban religious
principles as a choice of law for other arbitrations. 36 Ontario's new process does not
restrict the use of religious tribunals in any area other than family law. Arbitration
remains available to family disputes, even if it is in a hybrid form. The restrictions
have more narrow application than the Boyd recommendations, which applied to
both family and inheritance disputes and both mediation and arbitration processes.
Even in the area of family disputes, awards obtained with the use of non-Canadian
law are only unenforceable or of no legal effect. Parties are specifically empowered
to seek such advice. 37 Two willing parties could agree to use a faith-based tribunal
and abide by its outcome. The new amendments would not prevent this, provided no
enforcement was necessary.38 In this way, the new scheme still respects a party's right
to choose an alternate forum.
The new choice of law provision is likely to survive a Charter of Rights and Freedoms39
challenge because it does not single out religious principles as a restricted choice, nor
does it set special requirements for the use of religious principles as the Boyd recom-
mendations did. Instead, Canadian law is named as the only acceptable standard,
which excludes much more than just religious choices. This limits a Charter argu-
ment based on religious freedom because the express provision is of general applica-
36. Supra note 12.
37. Section 1 (2) and s. 5 (10), FSLAA, supra note 1.
38. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, "Submissions by the
Canadian Jewish Congress" in Official Report of Debates (Hansard), No. G011 (16 January 2006),
online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee-transcripts-details.
do?locale=en&Date=2006-01 - 17&ParlCommID=7422&BillID=297&Business=Bill+27%2C+Family+
Statute+Law+Amendment+Act%2C+2006>. This could create an opportunity to exploit the vulner-
able party that the legislative scheme seeks to protect.
39. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
Family Arbitration: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 61
tion and the effect of the choice of law provisions will not be disproportionately felt.40
There is no other comparison group with a greater choice of law. One cannot dismiss
the Charter argument entirely because the impetus for the legislation came from the
use of religious tribunals; a court may identify this purpose as infringing the Charter
or find that it adversely affects those whose religion requires them to resolve disputes
using religious principles.41 However, it is likely that declaring Canadian law para-
mount in family disputes would be considered justifiable and reasonable in accord-
ance with s. 1 of the Charter, and that a policy goal of protecting vulnerable parties
including children would be considered sufficient to override religious freedom. 42
The Supreme Court has overridden the religious freedom of the parents where the
best interests of the child are concerned.43 Finally, those parties whose religion re-
quires them to resolve disputes through the application of religious principles may
still adhere to this practice. They have lost only the ability to enforce the resolution
through the public courts. If enforcement is necessary, it would appear that one party
no longer subscribes to the practice and should be afforded that freedom.
The public has an interest in the resolution of family disputes and the protection
of vulnerable persons, especially children. In the past, some have lamented the
privatization of family law and the loss of public scrutiny of family dispute reso-
lution.44 Protecting the vulnerable is a worthy goal. Independent legal advice and
screening requirements will help to accomplish this goal. Restricting the choice of
law to Canadian alternatives will ensure that arbitration outcomes parallel what a
public court would yield. The reporting and record-keeping requirements may strike
a balance between the continued availability of private family arbitration and the
40. Law v. Canada (M.E.I), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497; Granovsky v. Canada (M.E.I), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703; Love-
lace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, 2000 SCC 37; Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325,2002
SCC 83.
41. Eldridge v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
42. The test for determination of the limits of s. i of the Charter is outlined in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R.
103. Proportionality of the effects is discussed in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
[1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, and Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877. Whether the leg-
islative goal is sufficient to override a fundamental freedom is discussed in Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.),
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, 2001 SCC 94. A government is not obligated to seek the least intrusive way of
accomplishing the goal: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2. Religious freedom is not absolute:
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2004 SCC 47; Jones v. R., [ 1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.
43. Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3; B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315. A distinction
is drawn between belief and religious practices and conduct. The latter has less protection, especially
when in conflict with laws of general application for the public good.
44. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Official Report of De-
bates (Hansard), No. G011 (16 January 2006), online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/hansard/commit-
teedebates/38_parl/session2/GenGov/GO1 1.htm#P676_219593>. See also Susan Boyd, ed. Challeng-
ing the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997); Ayelet Schachar, "Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The Perils of Multicultural
Accommodation" (1998) 6:3 J. of Political Philosophy 285; Owen Fiss, "Against Settlement" (1984) 93
Yale L.J. 1073.
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need for public scrutiny. Therefore, the public interest may be served by the new
amendments.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of separate restrictions on family arbitration represents a departure
from the existing Ontario policy in favour of arbitration and the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements. The change in policy is more drastic than that recommended by
the Boyd report. The new restrictions undermine the advantages of choosing arbitra-
tion as a dispute resolution process and will likely make such a choice less attractive
to disputants. Family arbitration is not without redeeming features, and protecting
the vulnerable is a worthy goal; however, the cost to arbitration policy is high. Just
how high remains to be seen.45
45 After the release of this paper but before its publication, the Ontario Government filed the regulations
relating to family arbitration.(O. Reg. 134/07) The regulations include standard provisions for all arbi-
tration and mediation agreements, mandatory approved training for family arbitrators, and arbitrator
record keeping and reporting obligations. The regulations come into force on April 30, 2007.
